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EMERGING STANDARDS FOR IMPLIED ACTIONS
UNDER FEDERAL STATUTES
The recent proliferation of federal legislation has created many situations
where a party, suffering injury as a result of another's conduct in violation
of a criminal or regulatory statute, is unable to bring a civil cause of action
based upon the provisions of the statute.1 In such cases, the courts often
find that a civil cause of action has been implied by the legislature, although
not expressly provided for in the statute.2 The inference of a civil cause of
action by a court has sometimes been attacked as constituting improper
judicial legislation. 3 The more widely accepted view is that, by recognizing
a civil action implied by the legislature as a part of the statutory scheme, a
court effectuates the overall legislative goal by adjusting the form of relief
4
that courts may grant under the statute.
Until the recent Supreme Court decision in Cort v. Ash, 5 however, the
federal courts had failed to develop a single, uniform set of standards to
determine when a court should find a civil cause of action implied by Congress. 6 Instead, varying presumptions regarding legislative intention and
1 See, e.g., Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77
HARv. L. REV. 285 (1963); Comment, Private Rights from Federal Statutes: Toward a
Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 454 (1968).
See also Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L.
REV. 361 (1932); Morris, The Relation of Crininal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46
HARv. L. REV. 453 (1933); Thayer, Public Wrongs and Private Action, 27 HARV.
L. REV. 317 (1914).
2 See, e.g., Note, supra note 1.
3 Note, supra note 1, at 285, 291; Comment, supra note 1, at 456 n.15. A basic
objection to the implication process is its alleged usurpation of the legislative function. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 428-29 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
4 See Note, supra note 1, at 291. Since the limits of an implied remedy are determined by the court, a variety of types of relief, including damages and injunctive
relief, have been granted in implied action litigation. Different considerations operate in determining the propriety of granting implied injunctive or damage relief.
For example, the danger involved in awarding monetary damages, especially punitive
damages, is the imposition of an excessive penalty, because the measure of damages
will be fixed by the extent of the injury, rather than by a statutory provision. Similarly, in granting injunctive relief, the court must exercise its traditional discretion
to minimize the possibility of interference with a statutory enforcement program.
Id. at 296-97.
5 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
6 Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implications
for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392, 1396 (1975). State courts are split on
whether to accept the doctrine of implied remedies. See Gamin & Eisberg, The
Implied Rights Doctrine, 41 U. Mo. KAN. C.L. REV. 292 (1972). Several leading jurisdictions allow implied remedies. See, e.g., Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86
Cal. Rptr. 401 (1970); Laczko v. Jules Meyers, Inc., 276 Cal. App. 2d 293, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 798 (1969); B.F. Farnell Co. v. Monahan, 377 Mich. 552, 141 N.W.2d 58
(1966); Caso v. Gotbaum, 67 Misc. 2d 205, 323 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
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rules of statutory construction were applied, 7 and as a consequence of this
judicial disunity, the results reached, particularly in the lower federal courts,
frequently lacked consistency. 8
This article will examine the theoretical basis for finding implied causes
of action in legislation and the development of the implication doctrine in
the federal courts. In particular, the Cort case will be discussed, both in
terms of the standards articulated by the Supreme Court in dicta and the
potential impact of Cort on the law of implied remedies.

I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPLICATION DOCTRINE

PRIOR TO Cort v. Ash
A. TheoreticalBasis of the Doctrine
Civil law courts have traditionally regarded legislative enactments as
embodiments of general legal principles and have commonly applied
statutes by analogy to circumstances which are not within the exact statutory terms.9 In contrast, American courts have construed statutes narrowly,
believing that statutory law was, unlike the common law, not a source of
general principles applicable in different types of cases. 10 Historically, except
in the field of negligence, American courts have been reluctant to venture
beyond the express statutory sanctions in order to impose liability for
failure to abide by statutory standards of conduct.1 ' To the extent that civil
remedies are found to be implicit in criminal or regulatory statutes, the
implication doctrine departs from the traditional Anglo-American judicial
treatment of statutes and resembles the civil law practice.
The implication doctrine represents an extension of the traditional practice of inferring negligence causes of action from statutory standards of

7 Compare Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (Civil in
personam relief held not to be precluded by the criminal penalties provided by
section 15 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899) and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964) (Civil relief available to stockholder for injuries resulting from
violations of the section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 bar on the
use of false and misleading proxy statements) with National R.R. Passengers Corp.
v. National Ass'ns of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as
Amtrak] (Section 307(a) of the Amtrak Act held to provide the only civil remedies
for violations of the Act,. thus precluding additional civil actions by aggrieved
rail passengers and T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959) (Postshipment challenge to the reasonableness of properly filed rates by shipper of goods
by motor shipper not allowed under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935).

8 Compare Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1057 (W.D. La. 1972),
vacated on other grounds, 488 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1973), and Western v. Hodgson,
359 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.W. Va. 1973) with Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108
(9th Cir. 1974), on the question of whether a private cause of action can be inferred from the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, § 1674(a), 15 U.S.C. §
1674(a) (1970).
9 Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 12-16 (1936).
10 Id.
11 Id.
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conduct to non-negligence contexts.1 2 The theory of implied actions, however, also is founded upon a judicial recognition of the duty to enforce the
purpose of a statute.' 3 Whereas Congress enacts a statute in order to accomplish particular goals, the courts enforce the statute on a case-by-case
basis and ensure the ability of the expressly provided sanctions to effectuate
the legislative purposes. 1 4 Statutory sanctions and remedial provisions may
be ineffective in accomplishing the legislative goals because of the failure
of Congress to consider all of the particular circumstances in which the
general provisions of the statute would apply. It can be argued that as a
deliberative body that determines general policy, Congress is institutionally
incapable of enacting statutes with detailed remedial provisions. Similarly,
the lack of effective remedies may be attributed to a legislative poverty of
imagination on the topic of remedial provisions. On the other hand, a lack
of specific remedies may indicate that, since the institutional role of Congress consists of the establishment of legal rights and standards of conduct,
Congress has delegated to the federal courts the responsibility of providing
the remedies necessary to protect congressionally created rights. Accordingly, in order to effectuate the goals of a statute, where the express remedies are inadequate for that purpose, the court may find a civil remedy
implied in the legislative scheme.' 1 By granting the right to assert
the traditional judicial remedy of a civil action, 16 the court, functioning as
a "coordinate lawmaker,"'1 7 engages in a form of "remedial creativity."18
The common law implication doctrine originated with the English case
of Couch v. Steel, 19 where the court found a civil cause of action in favor
12 Comment, Private Remedies Under the Consumer Fraud Acts: The Judicial Approaches of Statutory Interpretation and Implication, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 413, 430
n.85 (1972). This idea is also embodied in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286

(1965). Section 286 provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man
the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative
regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
a. to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and
b. to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
c. to protect the interest against the kind of harm which has resulted,
and
d. to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which

the harm results.

13

Note, Implying a Civil Remedy from 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a), 54

NEB.

L.

REV.

744, 749 (1975).
14

Note, supra note 1, at 291.

15 Id.

16See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 402-03 n.4 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
17 Note, supra note 1, at 291.
18 Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of
Torts, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33 (1968).

19 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (Q.B. 1854). .Couch is no longer followed in England.
F. POLLOCK, TORTS 158 n.(m) (1939). The modern English view considers statutory
silence on the question of civil liability to militate against implied civil liability.
See generally Williams, The Effect of Penal Legislation in the Law of Tort, 23
MoD. L. REV. 233 (1960).
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of an ill sailor implicit under a criminal statute requiring shipowners to
maintain a proper supply of medicine on board. 20 The court reasoned that
in every case where a statute enacts, or prohibits a -thing for
the benefit of a person, [that person] shall have a remedy
.. . 21for recompense of a wrong done him contrary to said
law.

In addition to recognizing that the violation of the statute involved both a
public wrong and a private wrong, the court, in deciding to infer the existence of a private cause of action, also noted that a denial of the implied
22
action would deprive the plaintiff of any remedy.
The United States Supreme Court first invoked the implication doctrine
in Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby, 23 where the Court allowed a railroad
worker recovery for personal injuries resulting from a violation of the
Federal Safety Appliance Act 24 by his employer.2 5 The Court found that
Congress promulgated the Act to protect railroad employees. The Act
expressly provided that injured parties were presumed not to have assumed
the risk of injury, indicating that Congress contemplated civil actions by
employees based on employer negligence, to which assumption of risk is
ordinarily an affirmative defense. 26 The Court stated the test for finding an
implied civil action as follows:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act,
and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to
27 recover
the damages from the party in default is implied.
Although the Supreme Court's approach in Rigsby achieved general
acceptance in the federal courts, 28 they recognized that the Rigsby decision
could not provide a comprehensive set of standards. Since most criminal
or regulatory statutes are intended to protect or to benefit some specific
group, strict application of the bare Rigsby formulation would result in the
inference of civil remedies from nearly all statutes.2 9 By not requiring an
examination of the efficacy of other available means of enforcement, the

20 The duty was imposed under 7 and 8 Vict., ch. 112, § 118.

21 118 Eng. Rep. at 1197.
22

Id.

23 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
2445 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 11-15 (1970).
25 Rigsby was overruled in Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934),
where the Court held that the Federal Safety Appliance Act no longer serves as the
basis of an implied civil action. The reversal is attributable to the proliferation of state
legislation giving workers redress in similar situations under state law. See H.M.
HART & H.

WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 798-806

(2d ed. 1973); Note, supra note 1, at 285.
26 241 U.S. at 40.
27 241 U.S. at 39. The Court viewed the case as one in which the ubi jus ibi
remidium ["Where there is a right, there is a remedy ....

" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1690 (4th ed. 1968)] maxim applied. 241 U.S. at 40.
28 See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
29 See, e.g., Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 429 (3d Cir. 1974) (Aldisert, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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Rigsby test neglects to focus inquiry upon the need for an implied remedy,
apparently limiting investigation to establishing injury to the plaintiff and
the inclusion of the plaintiff within the protected class. 30 Similarly, by
assuming that an implied remedy would be consistent with the statutory
purpose, no analysis was accorded to the potential impact of an implied
31
remedy on the effectuation of other, possibly conflicting, statutory goals.
Prior to the Cort decision, however, the federal courts had not generated
more comprehensive standards. Although the general Rigsby formulation
was accepted, the result reached by a court depended upon a variety of
conditions, including the language of the statute in question; congressional
policy goals evidenced by the statute and the legislative history; the nature
and efficacy of the enforcement scheme; the presence or absence of an
indication of congressional intent on the question of private remedies; and
the equities of each particular case. One commentator argued that the
approach employed by a court with respect to the significance of an absence
of legislative expression of intent regarding private actions is a function of
32
its predetermination of whether or not to permit a civil cause of action.
Courts varied the emphasis accorded to the numerous considerations, depending upon whether a civil action was to be inferred or denied. One line
of cases stressed the need of the intended beneficiaries of the statute for
redress from violations of the statute and the need for remedies sufficient
to effectuate congressional objectives, and found civil actions implied by
Congress in the statutes considered. 33 Another line of cases curtailed

30 Comment, supra note 6, at 1394.

Id. at 1394-95.
Note, The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes:
Judicial Insight, Legislative Oversight, or Legislation by the Judiciary?, 43 FORDHAM
L. REV. 441, 443 (1974).
33 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) (Victim of illegal search, seizure and arrest held to state a federal
cause of action under the fourth amendment to recover damages upon proof of injuries resulting from the agents' violation of the fourth amendment); J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (Civil relief to stockholder held available for injuries
resulting from a violation of the section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
bar on the use of false and misleading proxy statements); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive, Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) (Minority group union
members held entitled under the Railway Labor Act to a remedy in damages for violations of a union's duty to represent workers without racial discrimination).
Accord, Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974) (Civil damage
remedy available to employee discharged for one wage garnishment in violation
of section 1674(a) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968); Burke v.
Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970) (Former employee
of employer subject to the Railway Labor Act held entitled to civil action for reinstatement and damages resulting from discharge for union organizational activities
where employee was not a union member because his employee unit was excluded
from the certification election); Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417
F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969) (Migrant workers who accepted employment through
employment system established by the Wagner-Peyser Act held entitled to civil
remedies for violations of the Act); Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407 (E.D.
La. 1969) (Employee unlawfully discharged for testifying at a proceeding under
the Fair Labor Standards Act held entitled to a civil suit for damages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act for his unlawful discharge); Kardon v. National Gypsum
31
32

WINTER

1976)

Implied Federal Actions

implied civil remedies by emphasizing restrictive rules of construction and

8 4
the adequacy of existing remedies.
The differing results also reflected conflicting attitudes toward the
exercise of judicial power to accomplish implicit legislative goals. A key
assumption underlying the view favorable to implied remedies was that
Congress, in the absence of a contrary expression of intent, meant to allow

civil causes of action by parties injured by another's violation of a criminal
or regulatory statute. 35 Under this view, courts were free to infer civil
36
remedies unless restricted by a contrary legislative expression or act.
The opposing view was that in the absence of an expression of legislative
intent to allow civil actions, no civil remedies could be inferred.3 7 The
former approach viewed a legislative history silent on the issue of civil
actions as permitting implied remedies since a legislative intention to
preclude such remedies had not been expressed,38 while the more restrictive

view perceived such a legislative history as manifesting a legislative intent
39

to preclude a civil remedy.
1.1. Case Co. v. Borak4 ° and Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (Stockholders held entitled under the Securities
Act of 1934 to recover damages resulting from fraudulent inducement to sell their
stock for less than its true value).
34 See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975)
(Customers of failing brokerages held not entitled to a civil action compelling the
SIPC to initiate liquidation proceedings against the failing brokerage under the
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970); National R.R. Passengers Corp. v.
National Ass'ns of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (Section 307(a) of the
Amtrak Act held to provide the only civil remedies for violations of the Act, thus
precluding additional civil remedies by aggrieved rail passengers); T.I.M.E., Inc.
v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959) (Post-shipment challenge to the reasonableness of properly filed rates by shipper of goods by motor shipper not allowed under
the Motor Carrier Act of 1935); Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373
(1958) (Private action held not available under sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton
Act for sales at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of eliminating competition,
because such practices are unlawful only under section 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act which provides only for penal sanctions); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v.
Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951) (No civil action to recover
past unreasonable utility charges implied in the Federal Power Act).
Accord, Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc.. 456 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1972) (No
civil cause of action for damages resulting from violation of the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act available due to the exclusive nature of the penal sanctions
of the Act); Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953) (No civil action for damages implied from the criminal
obstruction of justice statute (18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1970)) where plaintiffs were discharged by their employer after being subpoenaed to and testifying before a grand
jury investigating the activities of the employer).
35
See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 512-14 (E.D. Pa.
1946).
36 E.g., Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031, 1033-34 (9th
Cir. 1970).
37 See, e.g., Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 894-95 (10th Cir.
1972).
38See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200 (1967);
Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1970).
39See, e.g., Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 894-95 (10th Cir.
1972).
40 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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States41 exemplify the favorable attitude toward implied remedies. Borak
involved an alleged violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,42 which makes the use of false or misleading proxy statements
illegal. One basis for holding that an implied civil cause of action exists
under the statute was found in section 27 of the Act which gives the federal
43
courts jurisdiction over any duties or liabilities arising under the Act.
Additionally, the Supreme Court found that Congress intended section
14(a) to have "broad, remedial purposes. '44 Notwithstanding the absence
of specific reference to private actions in this section, one of its main purposes was the "protection of investors," a congressional objective which
requires "the availability of judicial relief where necessary" in order to
achieve its end. 45 The implied civil remedy was also justified by the inability of the Securities and Exchange Commission to adequately enforce
section 14(a) without private actions as "necessary supplement[s] to
4
Commission action."
In Wyandotte, the Supreme Court held that the criminal sanction of
section 15 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 4 7 which proscribes the

negligent sinking of a ship in navigable waterways, was not an exclusive
remedy under the statute, but that the United States could bring a civil
action to recover from the owner of the sunken vessel the costs of removing the vessel from the waterway. An implied civil remedy was found
despite the absence of express legislative intent to allow such relief. The
Court articulated a set of criteria for determining when an implied remedy
should be found. First, the expressly provided criminal sanctions must be
inadequate "to ensure the full effectiveness of the statute which Congress
had intended. '48 This criterion mandates an analysis of the actual effectiveness of the enforcement program and a determination of the legislative
intent. Second, the interest of the plaintiff must be within the protection of
the statute. Finally, the injury must be "of the type that the statute was
intended to forestall. ' 49 The Borak-Wyandotte approach has been followed
in a number of cases.50
In several cases, the Supreme Court refused to find implied remedies by
41 389 U.S. 191 (1967). See also Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freightways, Inc.,
371 U.S. 84 (1962); Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031,
1034 (9th Cir. 1970); Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th
Cir. 1969); National Ass'n for Community Development v. Hodgson, 356 F. Supp.
1399, 1403-04 (D.D.C. 1973); Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. La.
1969).
42 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
43 377 U.S. at 430-31.
44 Id. at 431.
45 Id. at 432.
46

Id.

47 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1970).
48
49

389 U.S. at 202.
Id.

50 See, e.g., Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th
Cir. 1970); Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969);
National Ass'n for Community Development v. Hodgson, 356 F. Supp. 1399,
1403-04 (D.D.C. 1973); Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. La. 1969).

WINTER

1976]

Implied Federal Actions

narrowly construing the language and the purposes of statutes. 5' In
Montana-Dakota Utilities v. Northwestern Public Service Co.,5 2 the Court
refused to find an implied civil action which would have allowed recovery
of unreasonable past utility rate charges under a statute which made unreasonable rate charges unlawful. 53 The Court held that an implied remedy
to recover unreasonable rate charges would be incompatible with the
statutory scheme delegating the determination of reasonable rates to an
administrative agency, since the agency was not empowered to grant
reparations for past overcharges. The Court reasoned that since the federal
judiciary lacked the power to make rate determinations, an implied remedy
would be an "improvisation" 54 not intended by Congress. In effect, the
requested remedy sought to obtain indirect agency action on a matter which
Congress withheld from the range of direct agency action.
In T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States,55 the Court refused to infer a civil
cause of action in favor of a shipper seeking to recover past unreasonable
charges from a motor carrier on the ground that whereas the sections of
the Interstate Commerce Act 56 covering rail and water shippers expressly
allow a civil remedy for unreasonable past charges, the section of the Act
governing motor carriers5 7 does not provide a private remedy. Given this
omission in the statutory language, the Court held that it could not impute
to the Congress the intention to grant the requested remedy.
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad
Passengers58 (Amtrak) further demonstrates the use of restrictive attitudes
in denying implied civil remedies. The Amtrak Act, 59 except in cases
involving labor agreements, expressly provides only the Attorney General
with the right to institute a civil action. 60 The Court held that express provision of the remedy to the Attorney General precluded the inference of a
civil action in favor of the plaintiffs. The legislative history of the Act also
evidenced an intent to preclude civil remedies.6 1 Additionally, the Court
determined that the proposed implied remedy would conflict with the Act's
policy of streamlining the processes for eliminating unproductive rail routes
in order to save the overall passenger system.
51

See, e.g., T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959);

Nashville Milk

Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
52 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
53 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (1970).
54 341 U.S. at 255.
55 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
56 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
5749 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1970).
58 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
59 45 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1970).

6045 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1970).
61 414 U.S. at 457, 464-65. But see the lower court's opinion in Amntrak, Potomac
Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 475 F.2d 325, 336-37 (D.C. Cir.
1973), rev'd sub norn. National R.R. Passengers Corp. v. National Ass'ns of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974), in which the legislative history of the Amtrak Act
was held inconclusive on the question of whether the Congress intended to allow
the general public to seek redress for violations of the Act by means of private

civil actions.
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II. Cort v. Ash
Cort v. Ash 62 is the first decision to attempt to articulate comprehensive
standards to be used in determining -the appropriateness of inferring a civil
cause of action from a criminal or regulatory statute. The Cort guidelines
represent an effort to reconcile the sometimes conflicting approaches discussed in part I of this note. In this respect, the differing opinions in Cort
at the district and appellate levels are illustrative of the general judicial
disunity on the issue.
Cort involved a stockholder derivative suit against the directors of the
Bethlehem Steel Corporation instituted by Richard A. Ash, a United States
63
citizen and registered voter, and owner of fifty shares of Bethlehem stock.
The complaint alleged that Bethlehem had expended corporate funds for
partisan political advertisements 64 in violation of the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act of 1925 as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971. 65 This statute prohibits the use of corporate funds in federal political campaigns and provides criminal sanctions for violations.6 6 Ash sought
immediate and prospective injunctive relief against further corporate
expenditures in political campaigns and compensatory and punitive dam67
ages in favor of the corporation.
The district court denied the request of Ash for a preliminary injunction
and concluded that Ash had failed to establish the likelihood of irreparable
harm and the substantial probability of success on the merits, two of the
requisite preconditions for preliminary injunctive relief. 68 The district court
found the primary purpose of the prohibition against corporate expenditures
in federal campaigns was to assure "a popularly elected government," 69 and
that the protection of stockholders was only a secondary concern of the
statute, thus requiring a substantial showing by plaintiff of a congressional
62422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
63 1d. at 71-72.
64 The advertisements in question included excerpts from a speech given by
Stewart S. Cort, Chairman of the Board of Bethlehem Steel Corporation. Mr. Cort
urged Americans to mobilize "truth squads" in order to combat irresponsible political
rhetoric in the 1972 election campaigns. The advertisements were published in
August and September of 1972 in several leading magazines, including Time,
Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report, and in nineteen local newspapers

serving areas in which Bethlehem had production facilities. The $500,000 cost of
the advertising was paid from the general funds of the corporation.
65 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. III, 1973).
66d. The following penalties are prescribed: (1) $5,000 maximum fine against
any corporation or labor union violating the Act; (2) $1,000 maximum fine and/or
one year imprisonment for every officer or director of any corporation or officer
of any labor organization who consents to any contribution or expenditure by the
corporation or labor organization and any person who accepts or receives any
contribution; (3) $10,000 maximum fine and/or two years maximum imprisonment
if the violation was willful.
67 A second count in the original complaint stated a claim for ultra vires acts
by the corporate directors. This claim was omitted from the amended complaint
when the district court required the posting of $135,000 security. See note 168 and
accompanying text infra.
68 350 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
69 Id.at 231.
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intent to allow an implied action. Noting that the power of enforcement was
expressly vested in the Department of Justice and that the sanctions are
penal in character, the district court held that no private cause of action
could be inferred from the statutory scheme due to the exclusivity of the
penal sanctions. In a later, unreported order, the district court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment, reciting only that no material
dispute of fact existed, and that the defendants were not liable to plaintiff
70
for the alleged violation.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the
preliminary injunction on the ground that the finding of the district court
that plaintiff would not suffer irreparable harm from the denial of the preliminary injunction was not clearly erroneous. 71 It reversed, however, the
72
decision of the district court granting the motion for summary judgment.
The court of appeals found that a private cause of action, "whether brought
by a citizen to secure injunctive relief or by a stockholder to secure injunctive or derivative damage relief," was a proper means of seeking redress for
violations of the prohibition against the use of corporate funds in federal
73
elections.
The court of appeals utilized a two-part test for determining whether a
cause of action could be inferred from a statute. First, the enactment violated must be designed to protect "a class of persons including the plaintiff
from the harm of which plaintiff complains. '74 Secondly, the requested
relief must comport with the furtherance of the objectives of Congress in
enacting the statute. In the absence of an indication of legislative intention
to provide civil actions, the court should determine the propriety of the
remedy in terms of its effectuation of the underlying policies of the statute.
The court of appeals viewed the expressio unius est exclusio alterius75
maxim invoked in Amtrak merely as an aid in deciding when congressional
intent to preclude a private remedy could be inferred, not as a conclusive
76
presumption that no civil remedy should exist.
Although recognizing Amtrak as an instance in which the Congress clearly
indicated its intention not to permit a civil action, the court of appeals limited its application to situations where the remedy provided by statute "may
logically be said to be exclusive." 77r Thus, Amtrak was distinguishable on
the ground that the Amtrak Act 78 expressly provides for civil actions to be
70

Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 418 (3d Cir. 1974).

71-Ash v. Cort, 471 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1973).
72 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974).
73 Id. at 424.
74 ld. at 421.
75 "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY
692 (4th ed. 1968).
76
The court also questioned the extent to which Amtrak relied upon the expressio

unius est exclusio alterius maxim. 496 F.2d at 421 n.3. It observed that the Amtrak
Court, after stating the expressio unius maxim, also found legislative intent to withhold a civil remedy and determined that the requested remedy would be inconsistent
with the policies of the Act.
77 496 F.2d at 421.
78 45 U.S.C. § 547 (1970).
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maintained by the Attorney General, whereas the federal election statute
provides only criminal sanctions.
In applying the Borak-Wyandotte standards, the court of appeals found
that, as a voter, plaintiff Ash was within the class of intended beneficiaries
of the Act, and that, as a stockholder, he was a member of the class
secondarily protected by the statute. 79 Also, the harm of which Ash complained, the use of corporate funds in a federal election campaign, was the
harm that the Act sought to forestall. In concluding that its first standard
had been satisfied, the court of appeals rejected the contention that Congress, in a statute designed to protect the general public, could not have
implied a civil action. s0 Acceptance of this contention would foreclose any
possibility of a civil action being inferred from a criminal statute, since
most criminal statutes aim to protect the whole community. The court's
finding that the plaintiff, as a registered voter, was protected by the statute
would have been undermined by the acceptance of this argument, and the
court of appeals would have been compelled to find that plaintiff was sufficiently protected by the Act to be entitled to a civil action solely on the
basis of his status as a stockholder. The court conceded, however, that
"[t]he breadth of the protected class is . . . relevant to the propriety of
allowing criminal sanctions, rather than private actions, to enforce a statu81 This concession indicated the reluctance of the
tory prohibition .
court of appeals to embrace the logical implication of its view: an inferred
civil action to correspond to each criminal statute. s 2 Examining the purposes of the statute and the practical difficulties of enforcing the criminal
sanctions in the area of political contributions, the court determined that
an implied action would be consistent with the effectuation of the goals of
the statute. Finally, the court of appeals noted that there were no "countersuch as possible interference
vailing reasons" for denying a private remedy,
83
with the operations of a regulatory agency.
Judge Aldisert dissented from the decision. 8 4 Interpreting Amtrak as a
signal to restrict the use of implied remedies in federal courts, he viewed
the majority decision as a defiance of Amtrak. He reasoned that the rationale of T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States85 should control on the ground that,
"...

79 The court of appeals proffered two reasons for rejecting the argument that it
would be improper to infer a cause of action from a statute which allegedly provided
only secondary protection to the plaintiff as stockholder. First, while acknowledging
the possible impropriety of inferring an action in favor of an incidental beneficiary,

the court stated that the protection of stockholders was not a mere incidental

purpose of the statute. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948). Second, the
protection of the plaintiff need not be the primary purpose of an act in order to
justify the inference of a civil remedy. JI. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32
(1964).
80oTe court cited Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) for this proposition. But see Odell v. Humble Oil &
Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953).
81

496 F.2d at 423.

82

See note 88 and accompanying text infra.

83
84
85

496 F.2d at 424.
Id. at 426-29.
359 U.S. 464 (1959).
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although plaintiff brought his suit under Title II of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971,80 which contains no express civil remedy, Title
11187 contains an authorization for the Attorney General to maintain a civil
action on behalf of the United States. Judge Aldisert argued that the Title
III action supplemented the Title II penal sanctions, and concluded that
the failure of Congress to include civil remedies under Title II should be
construed to mean that Congress did not intend to permit a civil action.
Judge Aldisert also maintained that to grant an implied remedy to plaintiff
Ash as a registered voter was to find an implied cause of action "for every
individual, social, or public interest which might be invaded by violation of
any criminal statute."88
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals.8 9 Invoking the principle that the Court must decide cases according to the law existing at the time of the decision, 90 the Court held that the
enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,91
which created a Federal Election Commission empowered to bring civil
injunctive action under Title II, required reversal of the court of appeals
decision with respect to the requested injunctive relief. The Court also
reversed the finding that derivative damage relief was a proper remedy for
violation of section 610, holding that derivative damage relief was not
available to the stockholder for the 1972 violations of section 610, because
relief should be sought under the state law of corporations, which traditionally governed the stockholder-corporation relationship on the issue of
breach of fiduciary duty claims.
In dictum, the Court listed four criteria that are relevant in determining
whether a civil remedy is implicit in a criminal or regulatory statute not
expressly providing such relief.
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted," Texas & Pacific R. Co. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (emphasis supplied)-that
is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, either to create or to deny one? See, e.g.,
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of
Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 460 (1974)
(Amtrak). Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for
the plaintiff? See, e.g., Amtrak, supra; Securities Investor
86 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. III, 1973).
87 2 U.S.C. § 438(d) (1)-(5) (1970).
88 496 F.2d at 429. Judge Aldisert continued:
If the 'ambit of protection' test were to be applied to every criminal
statute by the court, then it would follow that, given particular circumstances, a remedy could be fashioned to afford civil relief upon the
breach of every criminal statute.

Id.

89 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).

90Id. at 76-77, citing United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103
(1801); Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974).
91 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c-h, 438 (Supp. IV, 1974).
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Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423 (1975);
Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964). And finally, is the
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652
(1963); cf. 1.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434
(1964); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 394-3952 (1971); id., at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).9
Conceding that provision for criminal sanctions in a statute does not automatically preclude the implication of a private civil cause of action, the
Court noted that in Rigsby, Borak, and Wyandotte there existed a statutory
basis for the inference that a private cause of action lay in favor of someone. In contrast, section 610 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 is "nothing more than a bare criminal statute, with absolutely no
93
indication that civil enforcement of any kind was available to anyone.
The Court, however, expressly refused to say that "a bare criminal statute
can never be deemed sufficiently protective of some special group as to give
rise to a private cause of action by a member of that group. '94 In the
instant case, however, the Court noted that
the intent to protect corporate shareholders particularly was
at best a subsidiary purpose of § 610, and the other relevant factors all either are not helpful or militate against
implying a private cause of action.95
The statutes which section 610 superseded 96 were based upon two
policies: the need to "destroy" the influence of corporate financial contributions on federal elections, and the belief that it is wrong for corporations
to make political contributions with corporate funds without stockholder
consent.9 7 Plaintiff Ash relied on the second consideration in bringing his
derivative action, 98 and claimed that the protective attitude shown to
stockholders proves that the statute provides stockholders with a federal
right not to have corporation funds contributed for political campaign
purposes. 99 The Court refuted this claim with a discussion of the legislative
history of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and its predecessor
statutes. 10 0 It concluded that the protection of stockholders is only a secondary or subsidiary purpose of the statute. 1 1 The primary goal of the

92 422 U.S. at 78.
93 Id. at 79-80.
94
95

Id. at 80.
Id.

96 Act of January 26, 1907, 34 Stat. 864; Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925,
43 Stat. 1070.
97422 U.S. at 80, citing United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948).
9SId. at 81.
99

Id.

100 Act of January 26, 1907, 34 Stat. 864; Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925,

43 Stat. 1070.
101 422 U.S. at 81.
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statute is the elimination of the influence of corporate contributions upon
federal elections. The legislation was not directly concerned with the relations between the shareholders and the corporation, and the plaintiff, as a
stockholder seeking derivative damages, therefore, did not belong to a
10 2
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.
The legislative history of section 610 contains nothing to indicate a
congressional intent to provide stockholders with a federal right to damages for infractions. Yet the Court acknowledged that
in situations in which it is clear that the federal law has
granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to
show an intention to create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose
to deny such cause of action
10 3
would be controlling.
Additionally, the Court doubted that Congress intended to provide corporate stockholders with federal rights that were broader than the rights
granted by state corporation laws.
Acknowledging the judicial duty to provide the remedies needed to effectuate the legislative purpose, 0 4 the Court stated that the requested derivative damage would not promote the realization of the main congressional
purpose. The recovery of derivative damages for violation of section 610
would not diminish the effect of illegal corporate contributions upon a past
election and would not necessarily have a deterrent effect upon prospective
violations. 105 The Court based its dubious conclusion that derivative relief
would not deter violations of section 610 on its opinion that such a remedy
would merely allow corporate officials to "borrow" company funds for a
period of time pending a compelled repayment. 106 This negative assumption
as to the effectiveness of an implied remedy as a deterrent is in sharp contrast with the attitude of the Borak Court and reflects a lack of curiosity on
the part of the Court in ascertaining what effect an implied remedy might
actually have on corporate behavior. In effect, the Court was avoiding an
argument that favors implication of a remedy. Thus, in the view of the
Court, an implied derivative damage remedy would not reduce the potential
influence of corporate donations upon federal elections.
Finally, the Court found it appropriate for state law to govern the claims
of the plaintiff. Unless federal law imposes special responsibilities upon the
corporation in its dealings with its stockholders, state law controls the

102

Id. at 82. The Court added that
in those situations in which we have inferred a federal private cause
of action not expressly provided, there has generally been a clearly
articulated federal right in the plaintiff, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, supra, or a pervasive legislative scheme
governing the relationship between the plaintiff class and the defendant
class in a particular regard, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra.

Id.
id.
See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
105 422 U.S. at 84. But cf. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433-34.
106 422 U.S. at 84.
103
1D4
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stockholder-corporation relationship. 10 7 Given that the primary purpose
of section 610 was to curtail the corporate influence in federal elections,
not to engage in the general regulation of state-created corporations, the
Court found that the relegation of shareholders to state remedies for the
illegal use of corporate funds in federal elections would not frustrate the
goal of the statute.'0 8
III.

THE MEANING OF THE

Cort STANDARDS

A. Especial Benefit
The first requirement is that the plaintiff be a member of a class "'for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.' "109 A secondary statutory
purpose of protecting the plaintiff or his class is insufficient to satisfy the
especial benefit test." 0 The requisite especial benefit may be shown by the
existence of a comprehensive legislative system controlling the interaction
between the plaintiff class and the defendant class,"' such as the control
of the Securities and Exchange Commission over transactions between
vendors and purchasers of securities.
The especial benefit standard represents a departure from the BorakWyandotte intended beneficiary approach to the extent that the intended
beneficiary approach did not require that the protection of the plaintiff class
be the primary goal of the statute. 112 For example, in National Association
for Community Development v. Hodgson," 3 a coalition of four lobbying
107 See, e.g., Miller v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir.
1974). If state law allows the use of corporate funds in state elections, stockholders
are on notice of such use. There is no need for redress under federal law. The Court
stated that it was
necessarily reluctant to imply a federal right to recover funds used in
violation of a federal statute where the laws governing the corporation
may put a shareholder on notice that there may be no such recovery.
422 U.S. at 85. See notes 146-58 and accompanying text infra. However, the fact
that state law allows the use of corporate funds in state elections is arguably irrelevant to the federal interest in preventing the injection of corporate funds into
federal election campaigns. The federal interest might be sufficiently important to
warrant a federal implied cause of action for violation of the federal statute,
regardless of state provisions regarding elections.
108 The statute at issue in Borak was distinguished as a deliberate
intrusion of federal law into the internal affairs of corporations; to the
extent that state law differed or impeded suit, the congressional intent
would be compromised.
422 U.S. at 85.
109 Id. at 78, quoting Texas & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)
(emphasis supplied by the Court).
11Old. at 78, 80-82. But cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-34 (1964);
Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970).
111 422 U.S. at 82. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which plaintiff was allowed a federal civil
remedy for damages for the violation of his fourth amendment right of immunity
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
112E.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964); Ash v. Cort, 496
F.2d 416, 423 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
113 356 F. Supp. 1399 (D.D.C. 1973).
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organizations representing the unemployed sought injunctive relief under
a statute 14 making it a crime to use a government subsidy grant for purposes of lobbying in Congress. Although arguably the primary purpose of
the statute is to protect the integrity of Congress and not to confer a special
benefit on a lobbying group, the court found that the interest of the plaintiffs fell "within that class of interests which the statute was intended to
protect." 115
Under the intended beneficiary approach several dangers existed. Plaintiffs could be found to be beneficiaries of a statute although the allegedly
intended benefit would be negligible. 116 The overexpansion of the classes
of plaintiffs eligible for relief under implied actions might have the effect of
subjecting the defendant class to a degree of liability unintended by Congress. 11 7 This potential danger is particularly evident in federal regulatory
statutes which adopt nationwide, federal standards or requirements. 1 S
The Cort especial benefit guideline imposes more stringent standards
upon plaintiffs requesting an implied civil action. It attempts to limit access
to the federal judicial forum to plaintiffs seeking redress for an injury to a
justiciable federal right. The especial benefit standard responds to the concern that implied remedies had become too readily available to plaintiffs
with negligible claims to protection under the intended beneficiary approach. Similarly, the criterion serves to delineate the parameters of civil
liability, which is a pressing need as regulatory statutes affect more hitherto
unregulated areas of conduct. Also, by withdrawing the availability of
implied remedies from secondary or incidental statutory beneficiaries, the
especial benefit standard blunts the criticism that the inference of civil
remedies constitutes a usurpation of legislative power since implied remedies will only be found in favor of plaintiffs whose interests are shown to be
the primary concern of Congress in enacting the legislation.
Alternatively, it can be argued that the especial benefit factor is an artifice. The difficulty of ascertaining whom Congress regarded as an especial
beneficiary, in contrast to a mere intended beneficiary, reduces the difference between the intended beneficiary concept and the especial benefit
factor to a matter of semantics. Since the especial benefit factor often will
be unable to distinguish intended and especial beneficiaries, to focus upon
such an elusive and potentially illusory distinction will divert attention from
the central question of the propriety of an implied remedy. Arguably, therefore, the especial benefit factor is not a viable measurement of legislative
intent and eligibility for an implied action, but is an imprecise, judicially
imposed requirement that will function as a device by which courts may

18 U.S.C. § 1913 (1970).
356 F. Supp. at 1404.
See, e.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970).
117 Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 747-48 (1975).
See also note 4 supra.
118 E.g., Doak v. City of Claxton, 390 F. Supp. 753, 758 (S.D. Ga. 1975); cf.
Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 349 F. Supp. 670
(D. Neb. 1972).
114

115
116
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deny implied actions in circumstances otherwise favorable to the inference
of a civil action.
B. Legislative Intent
Requests for implied remedies occur when no express remedy is granted
under the terms of the statute. The language of the statute or the legislative
history rarely explains the failure to provide a civil cause of action. 119
Rather than construe the silence of a statute on the issue of civil actions as
precluding such actions, however, courts generally seek to divine the intention of the legislature as to whether the statute should allow a private
action. Although such judicial efforts to discover the legislative intention
have been criticized, 120 the Cort opinion's inclusion of the leglislative intent
standard reaffirms its integral role in the implication process.
In support of the legislative intent factor, the Cort opinion cites Amtrak.
In Amtrak, the Supreme Court determined that the legislative history and
policies of the Amtrak Act indicated a specific, negative legislative intent
to preclude private actions. 121 Additionally, Amtrak invoked the principle
of statutory construction that "when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies," the coverage of the statute should not be
expanded "to subsume other remedies.' 22 The expressio unius est exclusio
alterius maxim would yield, however, to "clear contrary evidence of legislative intent.' 23 Thus, the Court in the Amtrak opinion concluded that
both the expressio unius and the legislative history approaches yielded the
same conclusion. 1 24 Cort strikes a balance between the Amtrak approach
and the view that allows implication in the absence of a legislative intent to
deny the implied action. 125 Although the Cort standards look to explicit or
implicit indication of legislative intention to deny or to allow a private
action, the circumstances in which this inquiry into legislative intent is
operative are limited. An intention to permit or create a private remedy

119 O'Neil, Public Regulation and Private Rights of Action, 52 CAL. L. REv. 231,

233 (1964).
120 Justice Cardozo assailed an effort to divine legislative intent as a "process of
psychoanalysis." United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 299 (1935) (Cardozo,
J., dissenting). Similarly, Professor Williams has characterized it as a "process of
looking for what is not there." Williams, supra note 19, at 244. According to Dean
Prosser, the result of the process is the discovery of an intent that is a "fiction,
concocted for the purpose." W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
191 (4th ed. 1971).
122

414 U.S. at 459-61. But see note 61 supra.
414 U.S. at 458.

123

Id.

121

Id. at 461. The Amtrak invocation of the expressio unius principle was followed in People for Environmental Progress v. Leisz, 373 F. Supp. 589 (C.D. Cal.
1974). In that case, the rejection of proposed amendments that would have permitted private actions was deemed indicative of the legislative intent and "most
124

persuasive in the circumstances." Id. at 591-92.

125 See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Similarly, in National Ass'n for
Community Development v. Hodgson, 356 F. Supp. 1399 (D.D.C. 1973), the court
stated that in the absence of a specific intent, it would "extract congressional intent
from analogous legislation." Id. at 1403.
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need not be shown where it is evident that some rights have been created in
a class by federal law. 126 By so limiting the scope of the search for an indication of legislative intent, the Supreme Court apparently accepts, in part,
the view that implication is permissible in the absence of a positive indication of legislative intent. In effect, where the plaintiff is clearly vested with
federal rights under the statute, the legislative intent criterion is subsumed
into the especial benefit test.
The legislative intent factor ,thus serves a limited function in practice. In
accordance with the Amtrak decision, the Supreme Court recognized that,
notwithstanding the creation of federal rights in the plaintiff class, an expressed legislative intention to withhold a private cause of action would
predominate. 12 Where the Congress has in some manner shown an intent
not to allow a private cause of action, as occurred in the legislative history
of the Amtrak Act, none may be implied. Yet, in the Borak situation where
the securities laws clearly created federal rights in the plaintiffs and there
was no indication of legislative thought on the question of private remedies,
the Supreme Court would allow implication without requiring a showing
of an intent to allow such relief.
The Cort opinion also explained the use of the expressio unius maxim
in Amtrak and T.I.M.E. In both of those cases, the legislative histories of
the statutes in question supported the inference from the expressio unius
principle of statutory construction that the expressly provided remedies
were to be exclusive. The record of section 610, however, lacks any congressional discussion of private enforcement of this provision, or of the
exclusivity of the express remedies. For this reason, the Supreme Court
rejected the suggestion advanced by the defendant in Cort and by Judge
Aldisert of the circuit court in his dissenting opinion that an inference
should be drawn from the fact that Title III of the 1971 Act provides some
private means of relief 128 of an intention to deny any private remedy with
respect to the criminal provisions amended in Title II. Another reason for
rejecting this attempt to invoke expressio unius was the Court's belief that
it would be "odd" to infer from the actions of Congress in enacting Title
III in 1971 "any intention regarding the enforcement of a long-existing
statute [section 610]."129 Accordingly, the Court viewed this effort to invoke expressio unius as "entirely unilluminating,"' 130 given the lack of a
supporting legislative history and the fact that the statutes were enacted at
different times.
C. Consistency with the Legislative Purpose
An implied civil remedy must be "consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme.' 131 To determine the propriety of inferring
126See note 103 and accompanying text supra.
127
128
129

Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975).
2 U.S.C. § 438(d)(1)-(5) (Supp. II, 1972).
422 U.S. at 82-83 n.14.

130 Id.
131 Id.

at 78.
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a civil remedy, therefore, the courts must ascertain the goals of Congress
in enacting the statute. This standard and the legislative intent guideline
comprise a cumulative, two-step analysis. Where it is determined that
Congress intended to preclude civil remedies, the consistency with the
legislative purposes question is subsumed into the legislative intent inquiry
and answered in the negative. Where there is no indication of a preclusive
legislative intent or where the statute has created some rights in the plaintiff
class, however, it is necessary to examine whether the requested civil
remedy would be in accordance with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme. In effect, the consistency guideline is operative as the second
phase of the inquiry into the compatibility of the civil remedy with
the overall legislative scheme.
In Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour132 (SIPC), the Supreme Court refused to infer a private cause of action under the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970133 in favor of customers of failing
brokerages who sought a court order to compel the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation to initiate liquidation proceedings against a failing
brokerage. The purposes of the statute were found to be the stabilization
of the securities business by halting the domino effect that failing brokerages have on other brokerages and the protection of brokerage customers.
The Court found that the requested remedy would further destabilize the
securities industry by enabling customers to compel the initiation of liquidation proceedings against an embattled brokerage, thus guaranteeing the
failure of the brokerage and increasing the brokerage industry's vulnerability to complete collapse under the domino theory. Since Congress
vested the Securities Investor Protection Corporation with the discretion to
initiate such proceedings, to permit a private action might interfere with the
34
exercise of these discretionary powers.
Similarly, in Amtrak, the two statutory purposes were found to be the
preservation of rail passenger service and the establishment of an expeditious method of discontinuing uneconomical routes. 135 Since an action by
rail passengers, the ultimate beneficiaries of the Amtrak system, to enjoin
the discontinuance of a route would frustrate the goal of efficient elimination of unproductive routes and would endanger the overall goal of preserving a viable rail passenger system, the Supreme Court refused to grant
the remedy. Justice Douglas dissented, viewing the primary purpose of the
132421 U.S. 412 (1975).
133 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (1970).
134 The Court stated that

Congress' primary purpose in enacting the SIPA and creating the
SIPC was, of course, the protection of investors. It does not follow,
however, that an implied right of action by investors who deem themselves to be in need of the Act's protection, is either necessary to or
indeed capable of furthering that purpose.
421 U.S. at 421. Borak was distinguished on the ground that the Securities Investor
Protection Act, unlike the Securities Exchange Act, does not contain standards of
conduct "that a private action could help to enforce" and it also lacks a "general
grant of jurisdiction to the district courts." Id. at 424.
135 414 U.S. 453, 461-62 (1974).
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statute to be the protection of "the people who ride the trains,"' 136 which
was a purpose that the majority "in its dedication to legalisms" had overlooked. 137 By denying an implied remedy and stressing the primacy of the
procedures for paring unwanted routes, the Court, Justice Douglas contended, was facilitating the advance of existing bureaucracies to their goal
1 '38
of "administrative absolutism.'
39
In Calhoon v. Harvey, the Supreme Court refused to permit action by
union members under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959140 for alleged violations of statutory standards for union elections. Section 402 of the Act, which permits the Secretary of Labor to bring
suits for such violations at his discretion, was deemed to provide the exclusive remedy for such violations. The Court reasoned that an implied
remedy would frustrate the legislative purpose of utilizing the expertise
and the discretionary powers of the Secretary of Labor in order to reach
a settlement of the controversy without litigation. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Stewart noted that by construing the statute so as to preclude any
preelection litigation, the majority was "sharply" reducing "meaningful
protection for many of the rights which Congress was so assiduous to
41
create."1
The Cort analysis requires the judiciary to examine the statutory scheme
for conflicting purposes and modes of enforcement. Before a court may
infer a private remedy, it must determine not only that the legislature has
not indicated an intent to deny such remedies, but also that the proposed
remedy would be compatible with the objectives of the legislation and the
enforcement scheme provided by Congress. The determination of such
compatibility involves a judicial assessment of the legislative purposes, the
need for protecting the discretionary powers of agencies vested with enforcement capabilities, and the potential impact of private civil action on
the overall scheme.
In many cases, a cause of action has been implied to remedy the inadequacy of the express statutory means of enforcement to effectuate the
legislative purpose. 142 For example, in Borak, the victim of a misleading
proxy was granted an implied remedy in part because of the inability of
the Securities and Exchange Commission to monitor all proxies and
enforce adequately the prohibition against deceptive proxies.1 43 In effect, a
plaintiff becomes a private attorney general through the device of the
implied civil action. 144 While Cort did not examine the efficacy of the enId. at 471.
Id.
138 Id. at 472.
139 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
14029 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970).
141 379 U.S. at 146.
142 See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d
136

137

569 (5th Cir. 1969).
143 377 U.S. at 430-35. See notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra.
144 See also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Gomez v.
Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969).
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forcement efforts of the section 610 criminal sanctions, because it found
that the plaintiff was not an especial beneficiary of the Act and that state
law controlled the stockholder-corporation relationship on the issue of
derivative relief, the tenor of Cort, the cases cited therein, and related
developments 145 seem to indicate that the supplemental enforcement by a
private attorney general concept is not as favored as it was in the 1960's
following Borak.
D. State Concern
Whether the requested implied cause of action involves concerns traditionally governed by state law must also be determined. An implied federal
cause of action may be inappropriate where such state law interests and
remedies exist. For example, the stockholder plaintiff in Cort sought redress
for an alleged misuse of corporate funds. The availability of traditional
state actions for breach of fiduciary duty and the commission of ultra vires
acts influenced the Supreme Court's conclusion that the inference of a
federal cause of action from an election law providing expressly for penal
sanctions would constitute an improper and unnecessary interference with
the traditional state regulation of corporations.
In Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 4 " the Supreme Court refused to infer a federal
civil remedy for abuse of process from the statute147 governing the issuance
of congressional subpoenas by the House Un-American Activities Committee, because abuse of power suits are governed by state common law tort
actions. With respect to the creation of common law rights by the federal
judiciary, the Court stated, "we are not in the free-wheeling days ante-dating
145 See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240
(1975) in which the Court refused to construe the private attorney general concept
as a "grant of authority to the judiciary to jettison the traditional rule against"
awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a suit "whenever the courts deem
the public policy furthered by a particular statute important enough to warrant
the award." Id. at 263.
Cort is representative of the recent trend of the Court that has diminished the
opportunities in which class action and public interest litigation can be maintained
in federal courts. Rather than diluting the substantive bases of such suits, the Court
has imposed stringent conditions on the exercise of the substantive legal rights. The
plaintiff in the public interest suit must now allege and show an actual injury to
himself in order to have standing to sue. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Similarly, in class action litigation,
each plaintiff must satisfy the jurisdictional amount or be dismissed from the
case; no aggregation of claims by class action plaintiffs to meet the jurisdictional
amount is allowed. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). The Court has imposed other disincentives on the exercise of legal rights in the public interest and class action areas. Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). In this context, the Cort limitations on the availability of implied civil actions continue the efforts of the Court to channel public
interest and class action litigation away from the federal courts and into the state
courts. See also McMahon & Rodos, Judicial Implication of Private Causes of Action:
Reappraisaland Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REV. 167 (1976).
146 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
147 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 601, ch. 753, House
Rule XI(l)(q)(2), 60 Stat. 828.
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Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.' 14 Congress had not empowered the federal
courts to create " a federal common law for abuse of process.' 49 An additional consideration was the limited scope of the statute in question, which
merely authorized the issuance of subpoenas without rendering federal
officials liable for acts done "'under color,' but in violation, of their federal
authority.' 150 In Borak,' 5' the Court held that, regardless of the fact that
state law issues might have to be decided incidentally, the rights granted by
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934152 were federal in nature. A federal
remedy is required to protect a federal right since the policy of the Act
would be frustrated if neither federal nor state law provided a remedy for
53
actions made unlawful under a federal provision. Similarly, in Bivens,'
the Court declined to relegate the plaintiff to state law trespass or invasion
of privacy remedies for alleged violations of rights guaranteed by the fourth
amendment. A federal remedy was deemed necessary because the interests
protected by the state remedies might be "inconsistent or even hostile" to
the interests protected by the fourth amendment. 5 4 In both Bivens and
Borak, the nature of the federal right involved warranted the implication of
a federal civil remedy.
In essence, the state concern standard represents a specialized inquiry
into whether the implication of a federal remedy would be consistent with
the underlying policies of the statute. Where a federal cause of action
would infringe upon state legal concerns, such an action, absent an overriding federal interest, could not be squared with the goals of the statute or
the traditional structure of the federal system. Also, the state concern
standard may operate to preclude a federal implied cause of action where
it would simply duplicate existing state remedies. Even before Cort, federal
courts had considered the state interest and the availability of state remedies in deciding whether to permit a federal implied action. 155 For example,
in the job-related injuries field, federal courts have refused to invade the
province of state workmen's compensation systems. 156 Similarly, the courts
373 U.S. at 651.
Id. at 651-52.
150 Id. at 652.
148

149

151 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
152 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).

403 U.S. 388 (1971).
403 U.S. at 394-95.
155 See, e.g., Byrd v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 496 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1974); Breitwieser v. KMS Indus., Inc., 467 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 969 (1973); Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 895 (10th Cir.
1972); Doak v. City of Claxton, 390 F. Supp. 753, 758 (S.D. Ga. 1975); 27 Puerto
Rican Migrant Farm Workers v. Shade Tobacco Growers Agricultural Ass'n, 352 F.
Supp. 986, 992 (D. Conn. 1973). Breitwieser held that
where Congress has provided a remedy but we are urged to formulate
153
154

a more extensive one, it is appropriate to look .

.

. to appellants' rem-

edies under state law to determine if additional federal relief is necessary to implement Congress' intent ....
467 F.2d at 1394.
156 See, e.g., Byrd v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 496 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1974);
Breitwieser v. KMS Indus., Inc., 467 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 969 (1973).
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have declined to find a federal remedy when an action could have been
brought under a state statute 5 7 or when the requested remedy was based on
facts which presented a simple breach of contract claim over which the
state court had jurisdiction.15 8 Moreover, in determining the consistency of
a remedy with statutory purpose and legislative intent, courts have
examined the potential impact on state enforcement schemes and the availability of state remedies throughout the nation. 159
The connection between the state concern factor and consistency with
the purpose of the statute is evidenced in Cort by the recognition of instances in which the federal interest overrides the state law concern. The
Court approved the inference of a civil cause of action in Borak, for instance, because Congress clearly intended the statute to be "an intrusion of
federal law" into a state law area. 160 Commonly, the federal interest which
justifies the inference of a federal remedy instead of recourse to state remedies is the need for uniform, nationwide enforcement. 18' Without such
62
uniformity of enforcement, the goals of the statute might not be realized.
The interest in a federal remedy also predominates where the federal statute,
in effect, creates a new liability for which there exists no analogous state
cause of action. 63
E. Interrelatednessof the Criteria
The Cort opinion listed four criteria to be considered in determining
whether an implied remedy should be found. The breakdown into four
separate factors conceals both the areas of overlap among them and the
essential two-pronged inquiry of the Cort considerations. Similarly, the
listing of four separate factors may also give rise to the erroneous inference
that all of the factors are of equal weight and importance. Basically, the
Cort tests determine just two facts: whether the plaintiff is a proper party
to be granted an implied remedy and whether the granting of the remedy
would be in harmony with and in support of the policies of the statute.
These two inquiries are cumulative in nature.
The especial benefit criterion, which determines whether the plaintiff is
eligible for an implied remedy, is the threshold test. In Cort, for example,
the finding that 'the plantiff was not an especial beneficiary of the statute
was dispositive of the case, and the Court referred to the other factors as a
See, e.g., Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 895 (10th Cir. 1972).
See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125 (1974); 27
Puerto Rican Migrant Farm Workers v. Shade Tobacco Growers Agricultural Ass'n,
352 F. Supp. 986, 991-92 (D. Conn. 1973).
159 See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
16 0 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 85 (1975).
161 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 409 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 435 (1964); Mortimer v. Delta Air Lines, 302 F. Supp. 276, 279 (N.D.
Ill. 1969); Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 365 (S.D. Cal.
1961).
162 See, e.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 435 (1964).
163 Note, supra note 1, at 292.
157
158
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means of reinforcing its initial conclusion. 1 4 Thus, failure to satisfy the
threshold especial benefit test renders unnecessary an inquiry into the
propriety of an implied action. In order to classify a plaintiff as either an
especial or a secondary beneficiary of a statute, however, it will be necessary to examine the policies and purposes of the statute. To this extent,
therefore, the threshold especial benefit inquiry overlaps the inquiry into
legislative intent and the consistency of the requested relief with the statutory scheme.
If an especial benefit is found, the other criteria ascertain the
propriety of inferring a civil remedy. As Amtrak and SIPC indicate, the
fact that a plaintiff is a primary beneficiary of an enactment constitutes,
standing alone, insufficient grounds for the inference of a civil action. 16 5
In other words, satisfaction of the especial benefit criterion is a necessary,
but not a sufficient, basis for obtaining an implied remedy. The legislative
intent criterion excludes implied remedies which are contrary to the expressed intent of Congress, whether or not the statute especially benefits
the plaintiff class. When Congress has not expressly indicated its intent to
preclude civil remedies, the legislative goals criterion requires that the requested remedy would not conflict with the purposes or the enforcement
scheme of the statute. Both of these criteria involve the judiciary in the
task of determining the congressional purpose from often ambiguous and
inconclusive legislative histories and from statutory language which occasionally is less than complete in articulating the concerns and motives of
Congress. Cort does not eliminate the possibility of judicially imputed
legislative intent and statutory goals. 166 Thus, while the especial benefit
requirement performs the critical threshold function of limiting the class
of eligible plaintiffs, the other factors are the most significant determinations since the inference of a remedy in conflict with the congressional
intent and scheme would constitute an example of improper judicial legislation.
The state concern factor actually is another aspect of the intent and
167
it
consistency considerations. As the factual context of Cort indicates,
may also serve as a means of limiting access to the federal court system
and discouraging forum shopping between state and federal courts. In Cort,
the plaintiff pursued a federal implied remedy rather than traditional state
remedies. Given the fact that the plaintiff dropped a state ultra vires count
from his complaint upon being required to post $135,000 security for
expenses as dictated by state law, 168 it can be argued that he pursued the
federal remedy as a means of avoiding the burdensome security rules of
state law, thus obtaining a less expensive forum. In this respect, the state
164

See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
and accompanying text supra.
that "legislative intention in the literal, lay

165 See notes 58-61, 121-24, 132-35
166 Professor Loss has commented

sense is one thing, and the growth of the common law by the interaction of judges'
decisions upon legislation is another." Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1041, 1054 (1960).
107 See notes 63-67 and accompanying text supra.
168 422 U.S. at 72. See note 67 supra.
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concern factor ensures respect for available state law remedies and prevents
the use of the implied remedy doctrine to convert the federal courts into a
cut-rate forum for plaintiffs seeking to circumvent the burdens placed by
state law upon the pursuit of a mode of redress.
The Cort guidelines articulate the key considerations in the implication
process while pointing out the areas in which more stringent standards
must be applied.

IV. THE IMPACT OF Cort
One significant impact of Cort will be in unifying the approaches of the
federal courts to the problem of finding an implied civil cause of action in
criminal and regulatory statutes. Additionally, the application of the Cort
criteria will alter the traditional availability of implied remedies. In this
respect, Cort may be viewed as a signal to the lower courts to find implied
remedies less frequently than in the past.
The reliance in Cort on the especial benefit factor to deny a remedy to
a subsidiary beneficiary of the statutory prohibition against corporate contributions to federal political campaigns restricts the application of the
implication doctrine. For example, in Pearlstein v. Scudder & German,189
the court inferred a cause of action that allowed plaintiff margin customers
an action for damages against securities brokers who violated the margin
requirements of the securities laws. 170 Although the primary purpose of
the margin requirements is to alleviate the deleterious effects of excessive
accessibility to credit, the court based the remedy on the subsidiary purpose of protecting the small investor from an unscrupulous broker.' 7 ' In
light of Cort, however, the continuation of such solicitude for the small
investor seems unlikely. It can be argued that given the financial purpose
of the legislation, such implied remedies in favor of the small investor are
inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation. To justify the
continuance of such implied actions, it will be necessary to demonstrate
that the propriety of implied actions in other areas of securities law, as in
Borak, attributable to the existence of a comprehensively regulated relationship between vendor and purchaser, applies as well to the area of
violations of the margin requirements, despite their primary financial purpose.
Similarly, strict application of the especial benefit factor casts doubt
upon the continued availability of implied causes of action to indigent
persons under the Hill-Burton Act 17 2 and regulations promulgated
169 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970).
170Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 7c, 29(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 17g, 78cc(a).
(b) (1970).
171 429 F.2d at 1147 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
172 Public Health Service Act § 600 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 291 et seq.
(1970). The Act provides federal funds to states and private parties for the construction and modernization of hospital facilities. The express purpose of the Act is
"to assist the several states in the carrying out of their programs . . . to furnish
adequate hospital, clinic, or similar services to all their people." 42 U.S.C. § 291
(1970).
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thereunder. 173 Although admittedly not the sole beneficiaries of the Act,
indigent persons have been regarded as "the object of much of the act's
concern."'' 1 4 For this reason, courts have permitted class actions by indigent persons to compel hospitals to comply with the regulation requiring
the provision of reasonable services for poor patients. 175 However, the
construction and modernization of hospitals is the primary purpose of the
Act, and under the especial benefit test, indigents would be unable to bring
an action to enforce the Act. The contention that sick people are the only
possible beneficiaries of a hospital program, however rhetorically appealing, oversimplifies the issues by ignoring the existence of potentially
conflicting goals which would militate against the implied remedy.
Application of the Cort criteria will also influence the type of reasoning
and result found in Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service.176 In
Gomez, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found an implied remedy
for migrant workers under the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933177 and, regulations' 78 promulgated by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to the Act. The
migrant workers alleged that the defendants had deprived them of the
benefit of the wages and working conditions promised by the statute and
regulations. The court found that the "basic objective" of the Act was the
establishment of an interstate system for the "recruiting and transfer of
labor,' 1 79 but that the regulations were intended to protect, and to confer
a legal interest upon, migrant workers. Despite the fact that the only sanction expressly provided for breach of the regulations was the termination
of federal funds, the court allowed the workers a civil remedy. The court
observed that without a civil remedy, the workers would have no protection,
since a civil suit under state law would fail to meet their needs. The court
found it inconceivable that Congress intended the termination of funds by
the state to be the sole sanction for violation of the Act. The court also
relied on the private attorney general concept to justify its decision. 180
Arguably, migrant workers are not the especial beneficiaries of the Act
under the Cort test. Apart from its basic goal, the Act additionally sought
to provide some protection to migrant workers. Yet, the court concedes
that the system established by the Act indicates its origins in the "dark days
of the economic depression of the 1930s."181 Thus, it can be argued that
17342 C.F.R. § 53.111(a) (1975). This regulation provides that recipient hospitals
are required to provide adequate services to indigent patients.
174 Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 319 F. Supp 603, 606 (E.D. La. 1973).
175 See, e.g., Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115, 1116-18 (10th Cir. 1972); Cook v.
Oschner Foundation Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603, 604-06 (E.D. La. 1973). Euresti relied
upon the legislative history and motivating intent behind the law. Cook relied on
the language of the provisions and deemed it unnecessary to examine the legislative

history.
176 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969).
177 29 U.S.C. § 49 et seq. (1970).
17820 C.F.R. § 602 et seq. (1975).
179417 F.2d at 571.

180 An additional basis for the decision was the reliance upon the civil rights acts
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)) as providing a source of an implied remedy. 417 F.2d
at 578.
181 417 F.2d at 572 n.8.
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economic recovery from the Depression, not protection of migrant workers,
was the primary purpose of the Act. 8 2 In this analysis, workers either are
not beneficiaries of the Act at all, or are only subsidiary beneficiaries not
entitled to an implied remedy under the Cort especial benefit criterion.
The Gomez case reflects the recent attempts of plaintiffs to utilize implied
83
civil actions to advance the goals of such causes as consumer rights,
ecology, 184 minority group rights,1 8 5 and political reform.' 86 In cases finding
implied remedies in these areas, the courts have relied upon the intended
beneficiary and supplemental enforcement by a private attorney general
concepts. Moreover, the future of the implied remedy in social reform cases
has already been suggested by a line of cases refusing to infer causes of
action. These cases, in contrast to Borak, stress the availability of state
remedies,' 8 7 the interference with the operations of the administrative enforcement mechanisms that such remedies would create, 88 and the absence
182 Armstrong, Expression Unius, Inclusio Alterius: The Fagot-Gomez Private
Remedy Doctrine, 5 GA. L. REV. 97, 125-26 (1970).

183 See, e.g., Nader v. Allegheny Air Lines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(Civil damage remedy for being bumped off airliner in a discriminatory manner
in violation of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 404(b) and regulations
promulgated by the Civil Aeronautics Board); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.,
485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Private parties have no right of action to enforce
the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act which prohibit unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce); Lovett, Private Actions for Deceptive
Trade Practices, 23 AD. L. REv. 271, 276, 279 (1971) (Advocating the development
of a consumer right to private action for injuries from false or deceptive trade
practices analogous to the private rights of action recognized under the Securities
Exchange Act).
184 See, e.g., People for Environmental Progress v. Leisz, 373 F. Supp. 589 (C.D.
Cal. 1974) (Private parties held to have no right to a civil action to enforce the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, because Congress intended to reserve enforcement of the Act to the Environmental Protection Agency and to the
Attorney General).
185 See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (Private citizens
have right to bring civil actions against state and local governments under the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 to ensure compliance with the Act); Gomez v. Florida
State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969) (Migrant workers who accepted employment through employment system established by the Wagner-Peyser
Act held entitled to civil remedies for redress of violations of the Act).
186 See, e.g., Common Cause v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803
(D.D.C. 1971) (Private citizens held to have right to civil action seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief for alleged violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act
criminal provisions limiting campaign contributions and expenditures).
187 See, e.g., Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890, 895 (10th Cir. 1972)
(Civil action under the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act denied, in part,
due to the availability of a state law remedy for the alleged injuries suffered by
plaintiff); 27 Puerto Rican Migrant Farm Workers v. Shade Tobacco Grcwers Agricultural Ass'n, 352 F. Supp. 986, 993 (D. Conn. 1973) (No implied civil cause of action
under the Wagner-Peyser Act, because the complaint stated a mere breach of contract claim that could be litigated in state courts and failed to state a WagnerPeyser Act issue).
188 See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 992-99 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (Civil action by private citizens to enforce the Federal Trade Commission Act
prohibition of unfair or deceptive practices in commerce not implied by Act, because such a right of private action would disrupt the enforcement efforts of the
FTC). Viewing the Federal Trade Commission as an agency capable of resolving
controversies in an expert manner, and usually without litigation, the court observed
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of any indication of legislative intent to allow such remedies by private
citizens." 9 The criteria articulated in Cort seem likely to favor the rationales and results of these latter cases, rather than the social reform cases
allowing implied remedies on the basis of concepts derived from BorakWyandotte.
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite the simple principles enunciated in Couch' 0° and Rigsby, 191 the
decision whether a private civil cause of action should be inferred from a
federal criminal or regulatory statute not expressly providing for one involves resolution of numerous difficult issues. Implication cases often raise
the question whether the implied remedy would be a proper exercise of
judicial power, either in the context of a potential usurpation of legislative
power or in the setting of an interference with the enforcement efforts of
administrative agencies. Similarly, the duty of federal courts to provide
remedies for the violation of federal rights must be balanced against the
concern that overextension of federal statutes through the use of implied
remedies will infringe upon the domain of state law. Beyond these considerations, however, there remains the fundamental question whether it is
appropriate in the given circumstances to impose a civil liability upon the
defendant for the violation of a criminal or regulatory statute that resulted
in an injury to the plaintiff. Answering this question demands an examination of the type of behavior prohibited by the statute, the statutory penalties
and modes of enforcement, the policies that the legislature sought to effectuate in the enactment, and the possibility that an implied remedy would
impose an unreasonable penalty on the defendant. In other words, the court
must evaluate the costs, as well as the benefits, that inhere in the inference
of a civil cause of action.
The nature of the decisionmaking process in implication cases demands
authoritative standards to guide the courts in their deliberations. Cort v.
Ash has supplied workable standards to be used in the implication process.
In accordance with the recent trend of the Supreme Court toward imposing
19 2
greater limitations on the use of implied remedies, as shown in Amtrak
and SIPC, 9 3 the overall impact of Cort will be to curtail the circumstances

in which implication will be permissible. 94 Nonetheless, with Cort as the
starting point for the emergence of a unified approach for federal courts
to follow, the future of the law of implied remedies can avoid the confusion
and unpredictability of the past.
-Gary W. Klotz
that the judiciary lacks both the FTC's expertise and flexibility of remedies to
achieve the most efficient resolution of a controversy. Id. at 998.
189 See, e.g., People for Environmental Progress v. Liesz, 373 F. Supp. 589 (C.D.
Cal. 1974) (Legislative intent to preclude private enforcement of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ascertained from the legislative history of
the Act).
10 See
191 See
192 See
193 See
194 See

notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra.
notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra.
notes 58-61, 121-24 and accompanying text supra.
notes 132-34 and accompanying text supra.
note 145 and accompanying text supra.

